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The European Parliament awarded its prestigious Sakharov Prize in October 2016 to two Iraqi 
Yazidi women who were held as sex slaves by Islamic State militias. Some months before, the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) issued its landmark conviction of Jean-Pierre Bemba for 
his responsibility as commander-in-chief for sexual and gender-based violence committed 
by his troops in the Central African Republic. Both events are evidence of the increasing 
awareness at the European Union (EU), and internationally, about the need to amplify 
women’s experiences of violence and their claims to justice. In Guatemala, for example, a 
court recently convicted two former military officers for crimes against humanity for having 
enslaved, raped and sexually abused 11 indigenous Q’eqchi’ women at the Sepur Zarco 
military base during the armed conflict in Guatemala. 
The fact that all three of the above events 
took place in 2016, and the idea that 
gender and sexual-based violence during 
conflict is being taken more seriously, even 
punished, is representative of longer-run 
processes that can be tied to the 15th 
anniversary of the Women, Peace and 
Security (WPS) agenda. Just some months 
before, in October 2015, the Global Study 
on the Implementation of UNSCR 1325 was 
published by UNWomen.1 The study reveals 
the challenges and lessons learnt through 
the implementation of the WPS agenda.2 In 
its chapter on “Transformative Justice”, the 
Global Study advocates for a broader scope 
of transitional justice mechanisms that take 
into account how women’s experiences of 
violence are related to their unequal status in 
society and, therefore, connects reparations 
to broader development policies directed at 
producing collective and societal forms of 
redress. In this sense, one could claim that 
the Women, Peace and Security agenda 
has had a real impact in awareness-raising 
in the international community and the 
development of gender sensitive security 
and justice policies. 
Particularly telling is the fact that on 
16 November 2015, the Foreign Affairs 
Council of the European Union presented 
its framework in support of transitional 
justice,3 effectively making the EU “the first 
regional organisation to have a dedicated 
strategy concerning transitional justice”.4 
The document was issued as a response 
to the commitment in the EU’s Action Plan 
on Human Rights and Democracy 2015-
20195 to develop an EU framework on 
transitional justice. In its conclusions, the 
European Council highlighted the fact 
that transitional justice is an integral part 
of the peacebuilding and post-conflict 
reconstruction agenda of the EU and 
that, consequently, an EU transitional 
justice policy needed to comply with the 
suite of United Nations WPS resolutions. 
Furthermore, paragraph 8 of the Council 
conclusions specifies that the EU should 
prioritise “gender sensitive transitional 
justice” and, similarly, that gender 
mainstreaming is a priority. This pledge 
follows previous commitments to gender 
mainstreaming in EU peacekeeping and 
crisis management and in its Common 
Security and Defence Policy. However, 
scholarly work suggests that EU External 
Action policies and practices do not 
take gender seriously and rather betray 
a conservative understanding of what 
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The aim of this working paper is twofold. 
First, I offer a short overview of what the 
EU means by a “gender sensitive” approach 
to transitional justice. Second, I explore 
whether this approach has transformative 
potential. Through my analysis, I argue that 
the EU policy on transitional justice tends 
to reproduce a conservative understanding 
of transitional justice that is equivalent to 
the existing EU conception of the Women, 
Peace and Security agenda. Although there 
are some successes in terms of language, 
such as, for example, an understanding of 
gender as a relational approach, the framing 
of, and roles attributed to, women and men 
expose serious shortcomings. Rather than 
tackling and transforming deeply rooted 
norms and practices in which gender 
inequalities are ingrained, the EU addresses 
“gender issues within existing development 
policy paradigms”7 and promotes a gender 
sensitive approach as “a way of more 
effectively achieving existing policy goals”.8 
This conservative understanding is evident 
in both how the EU constructs transitional 
justice, and also how it frames WPS in EU 
policy discourse. This has implications for 
the recognition of transitional justice local 
ownership and agency, as well as for the 
future of transformative approaches to 
justice more broadly. 
Drawing on Roberta Guerrina and Katharine 
Wright’s recent work on the tensions shaping 
WPS in EU external affairs, I analyse the 
particular understandings of gender, women, 
peace and security that underpin the EU policy 
on transitional justice. Through the analysis, 
I find that there are challenges for the EU 
gender sensitive approach to transitional 
justice in three categories corresponding 
to Nancy Fraser’s trivalent model of justice, 
which encompasses representation, 
recognition and redistribution. Understanding 
these challenges and overcoming them is 
essential, as the EU is likely to remain “the 
largest donor in the area of democracy, rule 
of law, justice and security sector reform 
and good governance, gender quality and 
support for vulnerable groups worldwide”.9 
The working paper is structured as follows: 
the next section explores the linkages 
between the Women, Peace and Security 
agenda and transitional justice. The second 
section examines how the EU understands 
these linkages. In section three, I provide a 
brief overview of the 2015 EU framework 
on transitional justice before delving into an 
analysis on how this framework integrates 
the Women, Peace and Security agenda, 
paying particular attention to how gender 
has been conceptualised. In this part, I offer 
a global synthesis of the findings on formal 
(format, references) and normative grounds 
(framing, distribution of roles, participation 
and ownership), detecting disparities and 
omissions in gender justice provision. Finally, 
I offer several recommendations for the 
implementation of a transformative and 
gender sensitive EU transitional justice policy.
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
PROMOTION THROUGH 
THE WPS AGENDA  
Transitional justice mechanisms and practices 
are directed to redress past wrongs, 
institutionalise the rule of law and construct 
new legal and normative frameworks in 
post-conflict contexts or in societies that 
have suffered occupation, dictatorship or 
other suppressive situations, in order to 
prevent violence and war from happening 
again. Although the United Nations refers 
to transitional justice measures as a set 
of judicial and non-judicial instruments 
and mechanisms, such as trials, truth 
commissions, lustration, memorials, 
reparations,10 there is not a predetermined 
set of standards in law or policy on how 
and whether transitional justice should be 
applied. Transitional justice practice therefore 
varies according to the geographical 
contexts in which policies and discourses 
on retributive, restorative and even (re)
distributive justice are being implemented.11 
Although they have been primarily focused 
on restoring civil and political rights, there is 
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but also to promote a sustainable peace 
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increasing advocacy regarding the need to 
also address social, economic and cultural 
rights, as well as collective rights to socio-
economic development. However, it has not 
been until recently that transitional justice 
has been situated as part of peacebuilding 
processes.13 This new scholarly work 
suggests that analysing transitional justice 
as peacebuilding practices provides a more 
holistic perspective on the links between 
dealing with the past and reconstructing 
for the future, enabling a more sustainable 
peace. From this perspective, transitional 
justice projects and outcomes have 
important implications for gender relations 
in post-conflict societies.
Paul Kirby and Laura Shepherd identified 
two approaches that could inform the 
future of the WPS agenda14 and that 
are clearly related to the two ways of 
combatting injustice – affirmative and 
transformative – identified by Nancy 
Fraser.15 The first, more conservative one, 
consists of making the links between 
sexualised violence and participation in 
order to understand how sexualised and 
gender-based violence prevents women’s 
meaningful participation in political 
and governmental spaces.16 The second 
approach proposes “an enmeshing of the 
parallel pillars of the WPS agenda in the 
process of peacebuilding and post-conflict 
reconstruction”.17 Kirby and Shepherd 
point out that this approach directly links 
transitional justice measures with the 
WPS agenda, as it focuses on reparations 
and development, connecting protection, 
prevention and participation measures at 
different levels and through a diversity of 
actors. Indeed, as they argue, if we take 
into account the way the provisions and 
principles of WPS cut across the range 
of institutions and complex processes 
of post-conflict reconstructions and 
peacebuilding,18 this second approach 
would constitute an enabler for gendering 
transitional justice on a case by case basis. 
Such a contextual approach is very much in 
agreement with the foundation of the WPS 
agenda as a civil society project that takes 
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seriously individual experiences of women 
and indigenous women’s organisations. 
Following the first approach described by 
Kirby and Shepherd, a range of security 
tasks to combat injustice are displayed in 
the suite of Women, Peace and Security 
resolutions. For example, UNSCR 1888 
focuses on access to justice, the rule of law, 
legal and judicial reforms, investigations 
and prosecutions. In turn, UNSCR 2106 
talks specifically about transitional justice 
mechanisms, particularly concentrating in 
punishing sexual violence. On the other 
hand, several paragraphs in the resolutions 
composing the Women Peace and Security 
agenda seem to engage with the second, 
more transformative, approach. For instance, 
a crucial enabler of participation, according 
to UNSCR 1889, is active engagement by 
Member States with civil society, “including 
women’s organizations”, in order to address 
the “needs and priorities” of women and 
girls. These needs include support for greater 
physical security and better socio-economic 
conditions, through education, income-
generating activities, access to basic services, 
in particular health services, including sexual 
and reproductive health and reproductive 
rights and mental health, gender-responsive 
law enforcement and access to justice, as 
well as enhancing capacity to engage in 
public decision-making at all levels.19 On 
the same line, UNSCR 2242 recommends 
“reparation for victims as appropriate”, 
while highlighting the need to end impunity 
and the capacity of the Security Council to 
enact sanctions against those that committed 
conflict-related sexual violence. The Global 
Study on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 
also calls on the UN and Member States to 
“[p]rioritize the design and implementation 
of gender sensitive reparations programmes 
with transformative impact”.20
The integration of all components of the WPS 
agenda in transitional justice mechanisms 
is developed briefly in the 2010 UN 
Secretary-General report, in which the global 
indicators tracking the implementation of 
UNSCR 1325 include both the “number 
and percentage of transitional justice 
mechanisms called for by peace processes 
that include provisions to address the rights 
and participation of women and girls in 
their mandates” and the “number and 
percentage of women and girls receiving 
benefits through reparation programmes, 
and types of benefits received”.21 However, 
critical voices underline the fact that gender 
targeted policies, with regard to access 
to health services, education, economic 
strategies, employment opportunities, 
legal reforms and, ironically enough, 
even policies on sexual violence, are often 
side-lined.22 They claim that if we are to 
ensure all pillars are given equal emphasis 
and to avoid reproducing gendered and 
sexualised identities where the international 
community is identified as saviours of the 
“brown woman” from the barbaric “brown 
man”, implementing measures should reflect 
the theoretical focus on transformative 
approaches to transitional justice.23
EU UNDERSTANDING OF 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN 
THE WPS AGENDA 
As a global security actor and regional 
organisation, the EU has been increasingly 
perceived as a key actor in the field of 
gender, peace and security, both in its 
policy commitments and in its peacebuilding 
practices. The European Council published 
its first document on the implementation 
of UNSCR 1325 in 2005 in the context of 
European Security and Defence Policy,24 
effectively making the Women, Peace and 
Security agenda a matter of external affairs. 
In 2008, the European Commission and 
the Council ratified the Comprehensive 
approach to the EU Implementation of the 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
1325 and 1820 on women, peace and 
security.25 The document is important as 
it outlines the fundamental principles of 
integration of the WPS agenda in projects 
and programmes of the EU and its Member 
States in the sector of security and justice in 
fragile, conflict and post-conflict countries. It 
suggests interventions in transitional justice 
mechanisms and acknowledges the need 
to integrate WPS in peacebuilding and 
transitional justice processes. 
Although at first sight revolutionary, as it, 
for example, clearly understands gender as 
“encompassing both women and men”,26 
the understanding that gender is a power 
structure that privileges masculinities over 
femininities is simplified. Even though 
admittedly there are several references in 
the document to gender differences, such 
as women’s exclusion from decision-making 
instances,27 gender is conceptualised as an 
individual attribute that a person has and 
that is immutable, not as the fluid and 
multiple power differentials that produce 
structural inequalities.28 Indeed, a closer 
reading of the revised indicators published 
in 2016 shows that this conservative 
understanding of gender remains the same 
after some years. For example, very few 
proposed activities concern participation, 
as the focus is placed on the question of 
protection against gender-based violence. 
This already shows an orthodox and 
apolitical understanding of WPS that strips 
the agenda of its transformative potential, 
since a focus on protection makes it very 
difficult for policy-makers to see beyond 
the label of women as victims.29 At the 
same time, the indicators also propose 
activities for the empowerment of women, 
supported through the creation of capacity-
building mechanisms that will transform 
them into agents of their own destiny.30 
The Comprehensive approach, therefore, 
does not seek to uncover the structural 
dynamics that harm feminised subjects 
disproportionately over masculine power, 
but rather equip women to be prepared 
to fill in spaces in governance and peace 
building spaces whose gendered dynamics 
remain unchallenged.
What is more, the language contained 
in the few paragraphs that describe the 
proposed activities dedicated to participation 
in transitional justice and peacebuilding 
reproduce a problematic understanding of 
gender that (almost) equates it with women. 
For example, paragraph 14 is specifically 
directed to “[s]upport to empower women 
and to enable their meaningful participation 
and the integration of gender and WPS issues 
in peace building and transitional justice 
processes”.31 In the language of the two 
indicators proposed to achieve this, gender 
appears only once, while women and 
women’s organisations appear four and two 
times respectively. The word “men” does not 
appear at all. Furthermore, the first indicator 
quantitatively measures the “number and 
type of peacebuilding and transitional justice 
activities in which the EU and its Member 
States provide specific support to enable 
women’s meaningful participation.” The 
second indicator looks at examples of best 
practices of “capacity building of women 
and women’s organisations to assist their 
involvement in and/or monitoring of peace 
building and transitional justice processes” 
and of “EU-supported consultations with 
women and women’s organisations to ensure 
their involvement in peacebuilding and in the 
design and implementation of transitional 
justice mechanisms”. The last part of the 
indicator goes back to the protection and 
support approach, as it looks for best practices 
in “addressing the challenges encountered by 
female victims in accessing justice or redress 
for violations” and in “[a]wareness raising 
and outreach activities to ensure that women 
are informed of ongoing peacebuilding and 
transitional justice processes and to facilitate 
their involvement.” 
The purpose of the indicators is clearly to 
develop strategies that ensure empowerment 
and participation of women in government 
and peace-building. Yet, this is done by 
constructing women as a homogeneous 
group that has the gender attribute of 
femininity and therefore, that shares an 
imaginary woman’s standpoint equated 
with victimhood and with peacefulness. 
This silences and naturalises differences 
and inequalities amongst women. What 
is more, the indicators that directly link 
transitional justice with the WPS agenda 
Security’”, International Studies Quarterly 57 
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clearly correspond to the first approach 
identified by Kirby and Shepherd on the 
future of WPS, where the important task 
is to uncover the mechanisms by which 
sexualised and gender-based violence 
prevent women from participating in 
public life. The Comprehensive approach 
and its implementing document do not 
merge the three pillars, connecting 
protection, prevention and participation 
measures at different levels, as required 
by a transformative approach to peace-
building and justice. In failing to do so, 
they are ill-equipped to challenge “the 
underlying structural causes of armed 
conflict, in particular the inequitable 
distribution of global power and wealth, 
which continues to be reflected in poverty-
stricken peacekeeping economies”.32
GENDER IN THE EU 
FRAMEWORK ON 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
In this section I conduct a discourse and 
textual analysis of how the EU constructs 
gender in its framework on transitional 
justice and related documents that make 
reference to gender justice and gender 
mainstreaming. I analyse which issues are 
considered to be gendered and how this 
conceptualisation informs which solutions 
are proposed. This means that I analyse not 
only to what extent roles are attributed to 
both men and women and to what extent 
standards, norms and behaviour of men 
and of women are questioned, but also to 
what extent there is a particular normative 
understanding of what gender sensitive 
transitional justice is and is not. Here I 
contrast and compare the EU approach 
with the trivalent model of gender justice 
based on recognition, representation and 
redistribution offered by Nancy Fraser.33 The 
model, which is also employed by Louise 
Chappell in her analysis of the politics 
of gender justice at the International 
Criminal Court,34 aims to tackle what 
Fraser’s identified as the three dimensions 
of gender (in)justice: economic, socio-
cultural and political. In order to combat 
socio-cultural injustices, Fraser upholds 
recognition through “revaluing disrespected 
identities and the cultural products of 
maligned groups”.35 Second, she advocates 
for economic redistribution through 
“redistributing income, re-organizing the 
division of labour” and third, in order to 
overcome the political dimension of gender 
injustice, she highlights the need for better 
representation of women and their interests 
in terms of the decision-making rules and 
procedures designed to claim justice and also 
in terms of individual and collective access 
to claim for recognition and redistribution. 
I reach the conclusion that the discursive 
subtext remains similar to the Comprehensive 
approach to the EU implementation of the 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
1325 and 1820 on women, peace and 
security, showing not only a narrowing 
down of the future of the WPS agenda, but 
also a conservative understanding of what 
constitutes gender sensitive transitional 
justice. This has implications both for the 
recognition of transitional justice local 
ownership and agency, as well as on the 
future of transformative approaches to 
justice more broadly. I do this by using 
NVivo 10.36 The methodology is based on 
an understanding of policy documents as 
containers of two dimensions: a diagnosis 
(what is the problem?) and a prognosis 
(what is the solution?).37 In both dimensions, 
there is an implicit or explicit understanding 
of what constitutes the problem, who is 
responsible for solving it and what policies 
and solutions are needed and possible.38 
Other solutions and policies are left out as 
they are deemed impossible or inefficient.
Overview of the  
EU Framework on 
transitional justice 
The EU’s Policy Framework on support 
to transitional justice sets out the way 
in which the EU can engage in helping 
ensure transitional justice for correcting 
situations of past abuses in partner 
countries. It does so by bringing together 
in a single document references to various 
aspects concerning principles, policies and 
instruments on transitional justice scattered 
in different EU external policies, from the EU 
Common Foreign and Security Policy to the 
EU policy on Human Rights and Democracy 
promotion. In the document, the EU 
indicates that the EU Policy Framework 
has two objectives: “to strengthen the 
EU’s position on transitional justice” and 
“to promote a comprehensive approach 
to transitional justice” in order to achieve 
“peaceful, just and democratic societies.” 
In its introduction, the Council proposes a 
very progressive approach to transitional 
justice, claiming that any such justice must 
be “locally and nationally owned, inclusive, 
gender sensitive and respect states’ 
obligations under international law”.39 The 
EU Policy Framework is divided into four 
distinct parts (see table 1). In the first part 
of the document, the EU relies to a great 
extent on the UN Secretary-General’s report 
“The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice 
in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies”, 
in which four mechanisms for providing 
justice are enumerated. As far as the second 
part of the document is concerned, the 
Council highlights at numerous occasions 
the need for a “flexible” approach, which 
it understands as a combination of a 
study of the context and the viability of 
the mechanisms proposed. The third and 
the most interesting part of the document 
proposes actions for implementation of the 
EU Policy Framework, in particular at the 
European External Action Service (EEAS) 
and in EU missions. The last part deals 
with annual reporting, monitoring and 
evaluation activities.
Elements Guiding principles
Implementation actions and  
instruments (non-exhaustive list)
1. Criminal justice
2. Truth-seeking initiatives
3. Reparations
4.  Institutional reforms/
guarantees of non-
recurrence
1. Nationally-owned, participative, 
consultative process
2. Context-specific
3. Comprehensive
4.  In compliance with international 
norms & standards
5.  Based on a rights-based approach
6.  Victim-centred
7.  Gender sensitive
8.  Child sensitive
9.  Situated within the security-
development nexus
1.  Continue cooperation with the UN, the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence and with 
regional organisations.
2.  Creation of an informal network of staff working on 
transitional justice across the EEAS and the Commission.
3.  This informal network shall develop more practical 
guidance.
4.  Training on TJ to EEAS, Commission services and 
Member State staff.
5.  The EEAS and the Commission will offer guidance on 
TJ as part of pre-accession political dialogue and annual 
progress reports with candidate countries.
Table 1: The EU’s Policy Framework on support to transitional justice: elements, guiding principles and main actions.
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Two formal aspects of the text The EU’s 
Policy Framework on support to transitional 
justice are analysed. First, I conducted a text 
search on the document to references that 
relate only to women (looking for terms 
such as woman, women, girl(s), mother, 
female), terms related only to men (looking 
for terms such as man, men, boy(s), father, 
manhood, male) and references that refer 
to both (gender, sex, sexual, parenthood). 
This word count is the first step in assessing 
the formal presence of a gender sensitive 
approach and provides an indication of 
whether there has been a formal shift 
from the use of “gender” with “women” 
interchangeably of the Comprehensive 
approach to the EU implementation of the 
United Nations Security Council Resolutions 
1325 and 1820 on women, peace and 
security40 and towards the understanding 
of gender as hierarchical power relations. 
Secondly, I examine whether gender issues 
are incorporated into all the separate parts 
of the EU Policy Framework. The text is 
scanned for references linked to gender. For 
so doing, I identified terms such as gender, 
sex(es), woman, women, female, girl(s), 
maternal, sexual, reproductive, mother, 
father, men, man, boy(s), masculinity, 
femininity, patriarchy/al, feminism, domestic 
violence, rape, sexual violence, and their 
location inside the document. From this, 
I assess to what extent a gender sensitive 
approach has been adopted in the three 
main parts of the document. 
As seen in table 1, content analysis of the 
EU Policy Framework shows that there is 
an overrepresentation of references that 
relate exclusively to women compared 
to references that relate exclusively to 
men. This is evidence of the fact that a 
gender sensitive approach is understood 
as proposing solutions to include women 
in transitional justice rather than to offer a 
genuine gender mainstreaming approach 
that involves both women and men equally 
in transitional justice processes. These 
results confirm those that Guerrina and 
Wright had obtained in their analysis of the 
Comprehensive approach, indicating that 
there has not been a clear improvement. 
Although the label is “a gender sensitive 
approach”, the language analysis reveals 
that gender is used to refer to women, which 
contributes to “associate gender issues 
with women’s ‘problems’”.41 Meanwhile, 
men, masculinities and forms of masculine 
power are never explicitly problematised. 
They are only mentioned once in a general 
phrase referring to equality between men 
and women. This finding is confirmed and 
analysed further in the normative grounds 
section that follows.
40 Guerrina and Wright, “Gendering Normative 
Power Europe”, 309. 
41 Marta Martinelli, UNSC Resolution 1325 
fifteen year on (Brussels: European Union 
Institution for Security Studies, 2015) http://
www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/Brief_29_
Gender.pdf
+ 
Although the label is “a gender sensitive approach”, 
the language analysis reveals that gender is used 
to refer to women, which contributes to “associate 
gender issues with women’s ‘problems’”. Meanwhile, 
men, masculinities and forms of masculine power 
are never explicitly problematised. They are only 
mentioned once in a general phrase referring to 
equality between men and women.
When conducting a text search to examine 
whether gender issues are incorporated 
into all the separate parts of the EU Policy 
Framework, I detected that 29 out of 43 
references to gender or related terms are 
found in the paragraph dedicated to the 
principle of gender mainstreaming. The rest 
of references to gender are to be found in 
the introduction. Indeed, gender is nowhere 
to be found in part 3 of the document 
that contains implementing measures or 
in part 4 on reporting, monitoring and 
evaluation. From this gender analysis, we 
can therefore conclude that there are no 
linked action items – no specific mechanism 
or particular financial means – allocated 
to make sure that the EU gender sensitive 
transitional justice is more than just a 
declaration of principles. The actions to be 
taken are therefore only those contained 
in the Comprehensive approach previously 
analysed and in the Gender Equality and 
Women’s Empowerment: Transforming 
the Lives of Girls and Women through EU 
External Relations 2016-2020 documents. 
This second document does not mention 
transitional justice once.
Normative grounds 
The formal aspects analysis conducted in the 
first part of this section show that there have 
been limited efforts at including a gender 
perspective in every aspect of the EU Policy 
Framework. Rather, gender is addressed in 
line with “add women and stir” approaches, 
as there is one single paragraph (containing 
principle 7) that mentions the need to 
comply with other policies pertaining to 
the Women, Peace and Security agenda.
How is the “gender 
dimension” framed? 
In principle 7, the EU recognises the 
importance of pre-existing gender 
inequalities in explaining the nature 
of the crimes committed and their 
consequences. Additionally, although 
the principle understands that victims’ 
experiences of conflict include sexual-
based violence, it recognises that victims 
also go through “socio-economic violations 
and gender-differentiated impacts of 
forced disappearances, torture, loss of 
family members and other violations or 
abuses”.42 It appears to be a very progressive 
understanding of gender that does not 
conflate gender with women. What is 
more, as children are provided a complete 
different section in the document (principle 
8 regards a child-sensitive approach 
to transitional justice), the document 
seems to have overcome the syndrome 
of “womenandchildren” that infantilises 
women, making them immature creatures 
unable to make their own decisions and, 
therefore, in need of protection and 
tutelage.43 However, in this brief paragraph 
of 24 lines, the phrase “women and girls” 
or “girls and women” appears five times. 
In three of them, “women and girls” are 
identified as victims in need of protection 
while in two of them the Council advocates 
for the need to ensure access to justice and 
women’s empowerment. This seems to be 
a step back from the framing of women 
in the Comprehensive approach and its 
implementation document that framed 
women as decision-makers more frequently 
(41 times) than as victims (31 times).44
Table 2: References to “women”/“girls”, “men”/”boys”, “gender” in the EU’s Policy 
Framework on support to transitional justice.
42 The EU’s Policy Framework on support to 
transitional justice, Joint Staff Working 
Document, 15 November 2015, 29. 
43 Cynthia Enloe, “Womenandchildren: Making 
Feminist Sense of the Persian Gulf Crisis”, 
The Village Voice 25 (9) (1990).
44 Guerrina and Wright, “Gendering Normative 
Power Europe”.
Number of 
appearances
Coverage as %  
of the document
References to women 22 0.08%
References to men 1 0.01%
References to gender/sex 15 0.07%
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What is more, participation is restricted 
to access to justice as victims and as 
witnesses, which is the aim of principle 6, 
directed at encouraging “a victim-centred 
approach”, somehow equating women 
and victims. At least, this provides the 
much needed explanation on what was 
meant by the vague “to enable women’s 
meaningful participation” in transitional 
justice proposed by the indicators in 
the Implementation document on the 
Comprehensive approach. This effectively 
demonstrates a lack of understanding of 
the various and often conflicted roles that 
women play during conflict and waters 
down the most transformative pillar of 
the WPS agenda. The paragraph finishes 
off by insisting on the need to end sexual 
and gender-based violence in conflict and 
post-conflict situations. In so doing, this 
concluding sentence seems to relegate other 
human rights and gendered-differentiated 
socio-economic violations to the bottom 
of the agenda, reflecting on the inability 
to overcome the prioritisation of sexual 
violence as the consequence of armed 
conflict in order to extend the focus beyond 
specific events and single human rights 
violations. Moreover, there is no explanation 
whatsoever as to how the “pre-existing 
gender inequalities” provoke sexual violence 
in conflict or how these are connected to 
the differentiated impact of conflict in men 
and women, persisting post-conflict wider 
structures of inequality and ongoing harms. 
Another important principle of the EU Policy 
Framework is the idea that peacebuilding 
and transitional justice measures need to be 
locally owned. In the EU Policy Framework, 
it seems as if the connection between local 
ownership and a gender perspective were in 
practice easy to achieve together, assuming 
that local civil society and local government 
are open to generate the structural changes 
needed in order to ensure gender justice, 
concerning for example how rape has been 
dealt with in traditional courts.46 Moreover, 
in the proposed actions, there is no reflection 
concerning the design of measures directed 
at ensuring an upholding of both principles 
without a prioritisation of one over the other. 
I am thinking, for example, about institutional 
reform – one of the four mechanisms 
composing the EU Policy Framework. More 
particularly, security sector reform (SSR) 
and disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration (DDR), which for their most 
part concentrate on refurbishing the police 
and the military without challenging gender 
power relations.47
Perhaps in an effort to comply with principle 
9 and situate transitional justice within the 
security-development nexus paradigm, 
the paragraph not only mentions the 
Comprehensive approach, but also the 
Joint Commission/EEAS Staff Working 
document Gender Equality and Women’s 
Empowerment: Transforming the Lives 
of Girls and Women through EU External 
Relations 2016-2020. However, although 
this document focuses on the economic and 
social empowerment of women, there is no 
reference to transitional justice mechanisms 
or economic reparations. What is more, 
although the document seeks transformation 
of women’s lives in four pivotal areas – 
ensuring girls’ and women’s physical and 
psychological integrity; promoting economic 
and social rights; strengthening girls’ and 
women’s voice and participation and shifting 
EU institutional culture to more effectively 
deliver on commitments – the EU Policy 
Framework only refers to the first area. 
That is, it only engages with the area that 
specifically deals with physical or sexual 
violence to women and girls, essentially 
separating socio-economic challenges from 
bodily harm.
How transformative are the 
solutions proposed?
The actions proposed in the document 
are directed at both EU internal dynamics, 
and the projects supported on the ground. 
However, they are much more directed at the 
internal dynamics of the European External 
Action Service, the European Commission 
and EU missions, such as reporting and 
information sharing procedures, and do not 
45 See, for instance, Sara Meger, “The 
fetishization of sexual violence in 
international security”, International Studies 
Quarterly 60 (1) (2016): 149-159. 
46 Catherine O’Rourke, “The Shifting Signifier 
of “Community” in Transitional Justice: A 
feminist analysis”, Transitional Justice Institute 
Research Paper 09-03 (2008): 269-291.
47 See, for example, Claire Duncanson, 
Forces for Good: Military Masculinities and 
Peacebuilding in Iraq and Afghanistan 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); 
Maria Eriksson Baaz and Mats Utas, eds., 
“Beyond ‘Gender and Stir’: Reflections on 
Gender and SSR in the aftermath of African 
conflicts”, Policy dialogue n. 9, The Nordic 
Africa Institute (2012), http://nai.diva-portal.
org/smash/get/diva2:570724/FULLTEXT01.pdf 
clearly propose actions directed at creating 
the conditions for the flexible, victim-centred, 
gender sensitive and child sensitive policy 
the EU Policy Framework advocates for. Two 
important consequences can be drawn from 
this. First, although principle 7 recognises 
the gender-differentiated impact of conflict 
and acknowledges survivors of conflict-
related sexual violence, it does not propose 
to transform the “underlying cultural-
valuational structure”48 by recognising that 
identities are multiple and non-binary, fluid 
and ever changing. That is, there is a simple 
affirmative recognition that can lead to an 
essentialisation of differences, constructing 
at the same time the category of women as 
homogeneous. As Fraser put it, affirmative 
recognition strengthens differentiation and 
promotes reification.49
Second, and related to the first point, 
although the third part of the document 
tries to translate the principles underpinning 
the EU Policy Framework into actions, the 
Council proposes no action concerning 
principle 7 on the respect of gender equality 
and gender justice commitments of a gender 
sensitive approach. For example, the Council 
proposes that EU Special Representatives’ 
mandates include the promotion and 
support of transitional justice, as they 
support stabilisation and reconciliation 
processes and contribute to negotiation and 
implementation of ceasefire agreements. 
However, the EU does not have a Special 
Representative on Women, Peace and 
Security, and therefore, no representative 
that will carefully look at how the provisions 
of the agenda are translated and respected 
in the implementation of gender sensitive 
transitional justice mechanisms. That is, 
top-down representation is still lacking. 
Bottom-up representation is only partially 
present, as even when participation of civil 
society or victims is addressed, it is to a 
great extent directed at producing input 
on EU policies. Although the document 
acknowledges the importance of local civil 
society’s participation and encourages the 
“active participation of the victims”, little 
attention is paid to the work of grassroots 
activists, or even citizens, who lack a formal 
institutional platform and who organise in 
more informal initiatives for the construction 
of transitional justice. For example, local 
gender justice practices may have similar 
goals to but predate the arrival of EU or 
other international peacebuilding and 
reconstruction efforts. The EU presents 
its gender sensitive approach as a model 
of virtue that assists victims of sexual and 
gender-based violence in transitioning 
countries who cannot speak or help 
themselves. There is no real place for the 
voices of women or their organisations to 
shape what kind of transitional justice is 
needed and which measures should be 
implemented. In addition, the narrative fails 
to recognise the plurality of actions already 
taking place on the ground, delegitimising 
the achievements of a whole range of 
feminist activists. This is also evidence of 
a “one-size-fits-all” approach towards 
gender equality that is not context sensitive, 
in contradiction with another one of the 
principles of the EU Policy Framework. 
Third, as far as redistribution is concerned, 
although there is a growing understanding 
that men and women experience conflict 
differently and that therefore, they have 
“differentiated needs with respect to 
accessing and benefiting from transitional 
justice mechanisms and processes,”50 there 
is no specificity as to how the design 
of reparation programs could redress 
+ 
If the EU directs its normative potential and high 
levels of expenditure on retributive and restorative 
transitional justice that limits the understanding of what 
is a “gendered sensitive approach” to crimes concerning 
(only) sexual violence, it also perpetuates the idea 
that the WPS agenda is directed at protecting women 
from (sexual) violence and at empowering women as 
participants and democracy promoters as key to security, 
development and international stability.
48 Fraser, Justice Interruptus, 24.
49 Ibid., 14.
50 General Secretariat of the Council of the EU, 
EU’s support to transitional justice – Council 
Conclusions, 13. 
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women in a fairer manner. What is more, 
the Comprehensive approach does not 
mention reparations or redistribution, 
and although we could suggest that 
Transforming the lives of Women and Girls 
is the legal framework for action on socio-
economic rights, the document seems to 
adopt a very instrumental approach to 
gender, in which the inclusion of women 
is not a matter of justice, but rather 
serves to achieve other goals in a more 
effective way. In this respect, it marks a 
departure from the understanding of a 
rights-based approach of the EU Policy 
Framework enshrined in principle 5 and 
which sees gender equality as an end in 
itself, towards a neo-liberal consideration 
of why integrating a gender dimension 
in external policies matters. Indeed, the 
Transforming the lives of Women and 
Girls working document assumes that 
women, due to their sex differences, 
will increase operational effectiveness, 
implying for example that women inclusion 
is related to less corruption and more 
economic growth.51 This runs contrary 
to a transformative transitional justice 
project. In such a project, EU-sponsored 
collective measures to achieve significant 
redistribution of material resources are 
needed in order to improve the social status 
of war-affected women.
51 European Commission, “New framework for 
gender equality and women’s empowerment: 
transforming the lives of girls and women 
through EU external relations 2016-
2020”, Joint Staff Working Document, 
SWD (2015) 182 final, 21 September 
2015, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/
sites/devco/files/staff-working-document-
gender-2016-2020-20150922_en.pdf 
CONCLUSION 
This working paper has done two things: 
First, it has offered an overview of the EU 
Policy Framework on support to transitional 
justice and its understanding of gender 
justice. Second, the paper has demonstrated 
that the EU has a conservative normative 
approach towards gendering transitional 
justice. It is clear that, although the EU labels 
its approach as inclusive, flexible and gender 
sensitive, the actions proposed do not follow 
suit. In 2017, the EU and its Member States 
continue to be the world’s largest aid donor 
and a champion in normative international 
peace and security. Despite the relative 
decline of the EU in the global scene, the 
aspiration of being a global political actor 
remains, with the clear aim of promoting 
justice and human rights values and 
principles, and leading on peacebuilding 
and transition to peace policies. Pending 
the first monitoring and evaluation reports 
on the implementation of the EU Policy 
Framework, the paper argues that as it 
stands now, the EU Policy Framework is 
ineffective in empowering gender sensitive 
transitional justice solutions in war-torn and 
post-conflict regions. A discourse analysis 
of the EU Policy Framework has shown that 
the EU offers a conservative understanding 
of gender, following the same narrative 
used in the Comprehensive approach to the 
EU implementation of the United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 1820 
on women, peace and security. Although 
there are some successes in terms of 
language, such an understanding of gender 
as a relational approach, the framing of, 
and roles attributed to, women and men, 
and the possibilities imagined for equal 
participation exposed serious shortcomings. 
Although aware of the perils of an 
overarching ambitious transformative 
goals on the EU transitional justice 
agenda,52 more specific actions pertaining 
to representation, recognition and 
redistribution directed at transforming the 
gender dynamics that are contributing to 
conflict are needed. If that is not the case, 
52 Pilar Domingo, Dealing with legacies of 
violence: transitional justice and governance 
transitions, ODI Background note (2012) 
https://www.odi.org/sites/odi.org.uk/files/odi-
assets/publications-opinion-files/7686.pdf 
53 Hillary Clinton, Remarks at the 10th 
anniversary of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace 
and Security, 26 October 2010, http://
www.operationspaix.net/DATA/
DOCUMENT/4123~v~Women_as_Peace_
Builders__On_the_Ground_and_at_the_
Table.pdf
when confronted with concrete situations 
that require paying closer attention to 
gender dynamics, the European Union 
will continue to face great difficulties in 
ensuring coherence and reconciling its 
objectives and policies on the ground, 
including its financial mechanisms. If the 
EU directs its normative potential and high 
levels of expenditure on retributive and 
restorative transitional justice that limits 
the understanding of what is a “gendered 
sensitive approach” to crimes concerning 
(only) sexual violence, it also perpetuates 
the idea that the WPS agenda is directed at 
protecting women from (sexual) violence 
and at empowering women as participants 
and democracy promoters as key to 
security, development and international 
stability.53 In what follows, the paper 
gives a series of recommendations in 
order to ensure the EU implements the 
EU Policy Framework in a truly gender 
sensitive manner and reorients its focus 
from tokenistic inclusivity of women and 
minorities towards social transformation.
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RECOMMENDATIONS – TOWARDS A TRANSFORMATIVE GENDER SENSITIVE EU 
POLICY ON TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 
 
 
As the EU Policy Framework is still in its infant years, and the first report regarding its implementation has not seen the light 
of day, this section offers recommendations for the development of actions directed at facilitating a transformative approach 
that restructures the generative framework of gender inequalities. This approach is based on an understanding there is a 
need to avoid depoliticisation of gender mainstreaming through toolkits, checklists and other box-ticking mechanisms as 
well as to acknowledge institutional and even individual complicity inside the EU in reproducing gender power relations. 
Such an approach helps identify the continuity of violence from wartime to peacetime and to avoid binaries, as it privileges 
ethnographic sensitivity, contextual specificity and a sophisticated understanding of the similarities but also the differences 
across individual experiences of gender and power. 
+ 
On representation – 
overcoming political 
injustices
•  That the EU informal task force develops 
a clear set of guidelines that will help 
translate the WPS commitments more 
clearly in the EU transitional justice policy. 
This can be done through the creation of 
a coordination platform for those involved 
in the implementation of WPS in the EU. 
The direction of the platform could be 
shared between a representative of the EU 
informal task force on transitional justice 
and a representative of the EU informal 
task force on gender and human rights.
•  That the EU gives consideration to the 
creation of a Special Representative on 
Women, Peace and Security. Although 
a positive step, the appointment of a 
Gender Adviser within EEAS does not 
go far enough. Higher seniority, direct 
contact with the EU High Representative 
and visibility are needed in order to 
strengthen EU’s commitments of gender 
mainstreaming in peacebuilding and 
development policy.54 Indeed, other 
regional organisations, such as NATO 
and African Union have appointed a 
Special Representative and a Special Envoy 
respectively, and have been considered as 
examples of best practice for other regional 
organisations to follow by the Global Study 
on the implementation of UNSCR 1325.
•  That the EU prioritises strategic planning 
and robust institutional support in the 
field for gender mainstreaming in order 
to overcome dominance and subordination 
schemes in transitional justice processes 
that can (re)produce gender hierarchies 
in the transitional society. 
•  That the EU Policy Framework identifies 
the elements that prevent women and 
other minorities from taking part in 
legal proceedings and tries to take those 
into account. For example, the distance 
between the location of women who 
need to give testimony and the court; 
the arrangements these women might 
have to make in order to leave dependents 
attended, etc. 
On recognition – 
overcoming socio-cultural 
injustices
•  That the EU makes its implicit bottom-up 
approach much more explicit in practice by 
reaching out to an alternative set of actors 
and taking seriously community-based 
justice, memory-making and reconciliation 
proposals, in particular women’s and 
LGBTQI groups, that appear disruptive 
and transformative. Informal truth-telling 
initiatives are deployed more and more by 
grassroots groups in order to challenge 
and reinterpret dominant understandings 
of gender justice.55 Only acknowledging 
and reaching out to these initiatives can 
ensure that we do not marginalise and 
exclude specific individuals or groups, in 
this case, women and sexual minorities 
from participating in decision-making 
processes and institutions.
•  That the EU makes available mechanisms 
through which interactions with civil 
society and in particular women and 
indigenous organisations can occur in 
EU Delegations on a regular basis. 
•  That the EU finds more creative ways of 
putting forward alternative readings of 
women’s and men’s roles in society. For 
example, peacebuilding and development 
programs could fund projects in the arts, 
in media and in popular culture, which 
are more likely to transform societal views 
on gender than traditional transitional 
justice mechanisms.
On redistribution – 
overcoming economic 
injustices
•  That the EU considers the creation of a 
reparations fund through an Instrument 
for Justice, similar to the Instrument for 
Stability.
•  That funds be made available to build 
links with research centres, strategic 
organisations and universities. The EU 
could leverage the extensive research 
expertise in this area, in order to ensure 
that the implementation of the EU 
Policy Framework pays due attention to 
gender as a power dynamic as well as 
the roles and representation of women 
in transitional justice mechanisms.
54 For a longer and more developed 
rationale on this topic, see Guerrina and 
Wright, “Gendering Normative Power 
Europe”.
55 Christine Chinkin, “People’s Tribunals: 
Legitimate or Rough Justice.” Windsor 
Yearbook Access to Justice 24 (2) (2006): 
201-220; Alison Crosby and M. Briton 
Lykes, “Mayan Women Survivors Speak: 
The Gendered Relations of Truth Telling 
in Postwar Guatemala”, International 
Journal of Transitional Justice 5 (3) 
(2011): 456-476; Shelby Quast, “Justice 
Reform and Gender”, in Gender and 
Security Sector Reform Toolkit, eds. 
Megan Bastick and Kristin Valasek 
(Geneva: DCAF, OSCE/ODIHR, UN-
INSTRAW, 2008); Niamh Reilly and Linda 
Posluszny, Women Testify: A planning 
Guide for Popular Tribunals (New 
Brunswick, NJ: Center for Women’s 
Global Leadership, 2005).
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